Safety integrity level (SIL) verification plays a critical role in reliability assessment of safety related systems. However, current methods available for SIL verification are too complicated to be applied in practice. Therefore, a novel method for SIL verification, which is based on system degradation using reliability block diagram (RBD), is proposed in this paper. The key idea of the method proposed is to perform RBD analysis and calculation of average probability of dangerous failure on demand (PFD G ) at each stage of system degradation, which is caused by failures of redundant channels. The method has been applied to several classical redundant architectures of safety related systems, and could make the SIL verification process simpler. Further, the formulae obtained are identical with those given in IEC 61508.
Introduction
Ever since compiled and published in 2000 being basic functional safety standard, IEC 61508 [1] has been adopted by many countries to establish their own national functional safety standards; in addition, it has also been used in various industries to develop various industries' functional safety standards, such as IEC 61131-6 [2] , IEC 61511 [3] . In order to achieve the required safety integrity level (SIL) for the safety functions, IEC 61508 adopts an overall safety lifecycle as the technical framework of safety-related systems (SRS). One of the necessary procedures of the overall safety lifecycle is the SIL verification, which verifies whether the average probability of dangerous failure on demand (PFD Average/PFD G ) of designed safety SRS meets the required failure measure [4] .
The SIL of SRS can be verified by reliability quantitative analysis techniques presented in the IEC 61508-6 [5] or ISA-TR84.00.02 [6] . They are both performance-based standards that focus on safety integrity level [7] . Summers [8] narrated viewpoints on ISA TR84.0.02. Those quantitative techniques include reliability block diagram (RBD) [9] , Markov Analysis (MA) [6, 10, 11] , Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [6, 12] , failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) [13] , simplified equations [6] , hybrid techniques [14] , Monte Carlo Simulation [15] , Petri nets etc.
Guo [4] studied PFD G calculations by the mathematical relationship between probability of dangerous failure and steady failure frequency using RBD technique but most results obtained are different from those in IEC 61508-6. Zhang [16] also studied PFD G calculations by applying Markov model and using the mathematical relationship between system unavailability and system failure frequency, however, the most results obtained are also different from those in IEC 61508-6. Innal [17] studied PFD G calculations and got the same formulae as IEC 61508 by using a continuous Markov model to approximate the exact Markov model, besides, he also explored other approaches to calculate PFD G . Jin [18] gave a common approach covering both low-and high-demand modes of operation and got results that are close to IEC 61508-6 by using Markov model. Dutuit [19] presented a methodology to assess the PFD G by means of Fault Trees and got similar results compared to the results obtained by means of Monte Carlo Simulations based on a Petri net model. Globe [20] introduced the FMEA technique to calculate the diagnostic coverage used in PFD G calculations. Oliveira [21] introduced a generalized equation for PFD G calculations to any KooN architecture by using simplified equation technique and the results obtained by the generalized equation are close to those in IEC 61508-6. Verlinden [14] presented a hybrid model combined a system level RBD and a Markov model to describe the dynamics of a safety shutdown system. Rouvroye and Brombacher [22] , Rouvroye and Bliek [23] , and Bukowski [24] compared these techniques and indicated that Markov and Enhanced Markov analysis techniques Contents lists available at ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ress can cover most aspects of the system's safety-related behavior except the uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, but Markov analysis is more complicated unless one masters background knowledge of Markov analysis which can be obtained in many books including Ref. [25] .
IEC 61131-6 is the functional safety standard of programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and the SIL verification of a safety PLC should conform to IEC 61508-6. The aim of this paper is to present a new thought and method for SIL verification, which provides a more simple and accurate method for SIL verification with high credibility based on system degradation, at the same time, it proposes solutions for the three new architectures in IEC 61131-6 with high correctness and accuracy since the results obtained in this paper are almost identical with those given in IEC 61508-6.
System degradation is the property resulted from channels' failures in a multi-channel system, and it enables a system to continue operating properly in the event of the failures until the system's fault tolerance reaches 0. From the perspective of system degradation, this paper dynamically discusses the RBDs of safety architectures and calculates PFD G for SIL verification based on the degradation processes, which contains consecutive stages of the system operation from fully functioning to degraded functioning until the system could not execute functional safety any more. This paper discusses and gives combined RBDs composed of each stage-RBD which are the same as the RBDs given in IEC 61508-6. Based on the RBDs obtained, the formulae of PFD G could be written out straightforwardly according to the degradation processes, and the mean unavailable time of functional safety for one channel (t CE /t 0 CE ) and one voted group (t GE /t 0 GE ) are also calculated based on degradation processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Terms are presented in Section 2. Section 3 gives assumptions. In Section 4, the RBDs of all operation stages are presented. Based on the RBDs obtained in Section 4, the detailed processes of PFD G calculations are presented in Section 5. Section 6 gives the results and the discussion. Conclusions are given in Section 7.
Terms
For better understanding of this paper, the terms given below are applied. Besides some terms defined in IEC 61508-6, this paper also defines a few more specific terms for indicating the consecutive stages of the system operation due to system degradation.
PFD
Average probability of dangerous failure on demand for one channel PFD 1 Average probability of dangerous failure of the any first failed channel in a multi-channel architecture PFD 2 Average probability of dangerous failure of the any second failed channel in a multi-channel architecture PFD 3 Average probability of dangerous failure of the any third failed channel in a multi-channel architecture PFD CCF Probability of dangerous failure caused by common cause failures PFD G Average probability of dangerous failure on demand for the group of voted channels T [5] . We should be clear about the definition and main difference among MDT, MTTR and MRT. MDT is the average time that a system is non-operational. MDT encompasses all downtime associated with repair, corrective and preventive maintenance, self-imposed downtime, and any logistics or administrative delays. The inclusion of delay times distinguishes MDT from MTTR, which includes only downtime specifically attributable to restoration. MDT is shown in Fig. 1 .
MTTR is the expected time to achieve restoration. MTTR encompasses (a) the time to detect the failure; (b) the time spent before starting the repair; (c) the effective time to repair; (d) the time before the component is put back into operation. MTTR is shown in Fig. 1 .
MRT is the expected overall repair time. MRT only encompasses the times (b)-(d) of the times for MTTR. MRT is shown in Fig. 1 .
Since the other delay times and the time to detect the failure (the time period (a)) in Fig. 1 both are ⪡MRT, so MDT EMT-TR EMRT is acceptable in the context of IEC 61508.
Assumption
In order to describe the degradation processes and PFD G calculations as clearly as possible, the following assumptions are made as a basis.
i. Component failure rates are constant over the life of the system; ii. Components (or blocks representing them in RBD) can exist in only two states: working ("up" state) or failed ("down" state); iii. The hardware failure rates used as inputs to the calculations and tables are for a single channel of the system. For example, if 2oo3 sensors are used, the failure rate is for a single sensor and the effect of 2oo3 sensors is calculated separately; iv. All channels in a voted group have the same failure rates and diagnostic coverage; v. All channels in an architecture are fully functioning after start up of the system; vi. The overall hardware failure rate of a channel of the system is the sum of the dangerous failure rate and the safe failure rate for that channel; the two are assumed to be equal; vii. For each safety function, there is a perfect proof testing and repair, i.e. all failures that remain undetected are detected by the proof test; viii. The proof test interval is at least an order of magnitude greater than the MRT; ix. The demand rate and expected interval between demands are not considered in this paper; x. For each system, there is a single T 1 and MTTR: the fraction of failures specified by the diagnostic coverage is both detected and repaired within the MTTR. MTTR includes the diagnostic test interval which is typically less than 1 h, the remaining being the MRT; xi. Multiple repair teams (each of them assumed to have the same repair rate) are available to work on all known faults in a system; xii. In a system being modeled, except common cause failures, failure (or repair) of any component must not affect the probability of failure of (or repair to) ANY other component. This implies that there should have sufficient repair resources to service those components needing repair and that when two or more persons are repairing a particular component at the same time, neither gets in the other's way. Thus failures of and repairs to individual components are considered to be statistically independent events.
Other assumptions can be referred to in the Annex B of IEC 61508-6 [5] and IEC 61078 [9] .
Reliability block diagram
The RBD modeling technique is intended to be applied primarily to systems without repair and where the order in which failures occur does not matter [9] . It should be noted that although RBD models do not take repairs into account, repairs of known failures are to be carried out.
Reliability block diagrams used for modeling system reliability are often more complicated mixtures of series and parallel blocks. On account of the statistical independence assumed in Section 3 above, failure of any block shall not give rise to a change in the probability of failure of any other block within the system.
Besides common cause failures, failures of a component can be divided in four failure modes: dangerous detected failure (λ DD ), dangerous undetected failure (λ DU ), safe detected failure (λ SD ), and safe undetected failure (λ SU ). According to the definition of PFD G : Average probability of dangerous failure on demand, namely, PFD G is a function of dangerous failure (λ D ¼λ DD þλ DU ). Fig. 2 encompasses reliability block diagrams of 1oo1, 1oo1D, 2oo2, 2oo2D, 1oo2, 1oo2D, 2oo3, 2oo3D and 1oo3 architectures. Among them, 1oo1D, 2oo2D, and 2oo3D are the three new architectures proposed by IEC 61131-6 [2] .
It should be noted that actually all architectures have diagnostic channels, but the diagnostic channels in a moonD architecture would report the fault detected and change output states or output voting, while the diagnostic channel in a moon architecture would only report the fault detected and would not change any output states or output voting, therefore, a moonD architecture and a moon architecture may have different reactions when a fault is detected.
1oo1 architecture
This is the simplest architecture, and it is the foundation of other architectures; at the same time, its RBD is the foundation to get other architectures' RBD.
This architecture consists of a single channel with 0 HFT, so any dangerous failure leads to a failure of the safety function when a demand arises. The reliability block diagram of 1oo1 architecture is shown in Fig. 2a .
Actually, 1oo1 architecture is seldom used in reality for its poor safety and availability.
1oo1D architecture
This architecture has no redundancy but has a diagnostic channel which would change output states or the output voting. The diagnostic channel provides a secondary means to de-energize the outputs and put the process under control in a safe state. This diagnostic function de-energizes the secondary contact output if a dangerous failure is detected.
Any detected failure will lead to shutdown of the system since its hardware fault tolerance (HFT) is 0. As stated above, PFD G is a function of λ DD and λ DU . However, this architecture will put the system into a safe state if a λ DD is detected since the system has to be shut down to replace the failed module. So, although λ DD can be detected by diagnostic function, it will not result in a dangerous failure of the system using this architecture. Consequently, λ DD is not taken into account in its RBD. The RBD of 1oo1D architecture is shown in Fig. 2b. 
2oo2 architecture
This architecture consists of two channels (1oo1) connected in parallel so that both channels need to demand the safety function before it can take place. Any channel's failure would result in the failure of this architecture, so, its reliability block diagram is two RBDs of 1oo1 architecture connected in series as shown in Fig. 2c. 
2oo2D architecture
This redundant architecture has two independent channels (1oo1D) both with a secondary means of de-energizing the output of a leg if a dangerous failure in the channel is detected. Hence both channels must demand the safety function before it can take place. Therefore, the reliability block diagram of this architecture is two RBDs of 1oo1D architecture connected in series as shown in Fig. 2d. 
1oo2 architecture
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel, such that either channel can process the safety function, i.e. HFT is 1. Thus there would have to be a dangerous failure in both channels before a safety function failed on demand. Since the HFT is 1, it can degrade to continue operating when a dangerous failure causes the failure of any one channel.
After the system is started until any one channel is failed to execute functional safety, all channels are working independently, and have the same failure rates and the same MUnTs (t CE ) which are identical with the failure rate and MUnT of 1oo1 architecture, any channel's failing will result in a degradation of the system. The RBD of the system in this stage is shown in Fig. 2e-1. After degradation, the 1oo2 architecture degrades to 1oo1 architecture to continue working but with different MUnT (t GE ). Because any dangerous failure in this remaining channel would lead to the failure of the system, so the MAT of the remaining channel (from the system starts working to the system is unavailable to execute functional safety) is the voted group equivalent mean up time, i.e. MUnT of the remaining channel is the voted group equivalent mean down time t GE . The reliability block diagram in this stage is shown in Fig. 2e-2 .
Combine the RBDs above of two different operation stages of the system and consider common cause failure as shown in Fig. 2e-3 , the combined reliability block diagram of this architecture is shown in Fig. 2e-4. 
1oo2D architecture
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel. During normal operation, both channels need to demand the safety function before it can take place. In addition, the HFT of this architecture is 1, which means the system will degrade to continue operation in 1oo1D architecture if any one channel is down.
Both two channels are working after the system is started, and any detected failure in any channel would cause a safety shutdown of the channel and then the system degrades to continue operation in 1oo1D architecture, i.e., λ DD and λ SD both will lead to a degradation of the system. As a result, λ DD and λ SD are both taken into account in the RBD of this stage as shown in Fig. 2f-1 .
After any one channel fails, the architecture degrades to 1oo1D architecture to continue working. Like the RBD of 1oo1D architecture, as shown in Fig. 2f-2 , the RBD in this stage considers λ DU only but with different MUnT (t 0 GE ) since the MUnT of this remaining channel is the voted group equivalent mean down time t 0 GE .
Combine two stages' RBDs above and consider common cause failure as shown in Fig. 2e-3 , the combined reliability block diagram of this architecture is shown in Fig. 2f-3. 
2oo3 architecture
This architecture has 1 HFT and has two operation stages. All three channels are working after the system is started, then the architecture degrades to 2oo2 architecture to continue working after any one channel is failed.
As stated above, diagnostic function only reports the failure found but would not change any output states, and λ SD is not taken into account. So the RBDs of two operation stages shown in Figs. 2g-1 and g-2 are just like 1oo2 architecture, the only difference between 2oo3 and 1oo2 architecture is the number of working channels in two operation stages.
The combined reliability block diagram of this architecture is shown in Fig. 2g-3. 
2oo3D architecture
Like 2oo3 architecture, all three channels are working after the system starts to work, and the architecture degrades to 2oo2D architecture to continue working after any one channel is failed.
Based on the analysis of 1oo2D architecture, the RBDs of two operation stages are shown in Figs. 2h-1 and h-2 just like 1oo2D architecture, the only difference between 2oo3D and 1oo2D architecture is the number of working channels in two operation stages.
The combined reliability block diagram of this architecture is shown in Fig. 2h-3. 
1oo3 architecture
This architecture's HFT is 2 and it has three operation stages, which is the difference between 1oo3 and 2oo3 architecture. Based on the analysis of 2oo3 architecture, the RBDs of three operation stages are shown in Figs. 2i-1, i-2 and i-3. The MUnT (t G2E ) labeled in Fig. 2i-3 represents the voted group equivalent mean down of this architecture since it is mean unavailable time of functional safety for the last failed channel in this architecture.
The combined RBDs in Fig. 2 are the same as the RBDs given in IEC 61508-6. From the viewpoints of system degradation, almost all of the RBDs given in IEC 61508-6, especially those whose HFT is greater than 0 (a system with 0 HFT could not degrade), in fact, are not genuine RBDs in the real sense. They are combinations of the all RBDs of consecutive stages of system operation, including degradation operation stages. In those RBDs, channels labeled with different MUnTs (t CE and t GE ) represent different operation stages of the system.
PFD G calculation

MUnT and PFD G for a single channel
For generalization, let us assume that a channel is made up of two components in series, with the respective failure rates and repair rates: λ 1 , μ 1 and λ 2 , μ 2 , and suppose that λ 1 and λ 2 have contributions to PFD G . Using an equivalent component replace these two components, the failure rate and repair rate of the equivalent component are λ and μ.
Before replacement, the reliability of the channel is
after replacement, the reliability of the channel is
Comparing two equations above, obviously,
Before replacement, the probability of the channel in available state is
after replacement, the probability of the channel in available state is
Therefore,
As MUnT 1 % 1=μ 1 ; MUnT 2 % 1=μ 2 ; MUnT % 1=μ; then
Since
Hence,
For a channel consists of n components connected in series,
Since λ MUnT⪡1, PFD G for single channel in time interval [0, MUnT] is,
1oo1 architecture
Since this architecture has a single channel, t CE is the mean down time of the architecture.
According to its RBD as shown in Fig. 2a and Eq. (1),
where MUnT
The reliability of the component with failure rate λ DU in this channel is
RðtÞ
CE ¼ e À λDU t :
then [16] ,
Hence, based on Eq. (2), for 1oo1 architecture,
1oo1D architecture
As analyzed in Section 4.2 above, the RBD of this architecture as shown in Fig. 2b , only contains λ DU , then according to Eq. (3), the mean down time of this architecture becomes
Hence, based on Eq. (2), for 1oo1D architecture,
2oo2 architecture
According to the RBD of this architecture as shown in Fig. 2c , it consists of two 1oo1 architectures connected in series, then based on the calculations of 1oo1 architecture, for 2oo2 architecture,
2oo2D architecture
According to the RBD of this architecture as shown in Fig. 2d , it consists of two 1oo1D architectures connected in series, then based on the calculations of 1oo1D architecture, for 2oo2D architecture,
1oo2 architecture
After the system is started and until any one channel is failed to execute functional safety, both two channels are working, and both two channels have the same failure rates (λ D ) and the same MUnTs (t CE ) which are identical with the failure rate and MUnT of 1oo1 architecture, namely, both two channels have the same probability of dangerous failure that results in a degradation of system to 1oo1 architecture. Based on Eqs. (1) and (2), replace λ 1 , λ 2 with λ DU , λ DD , then exclude common cause failures represented by the β-factor model, the probability of dangerous failure of any one channel in this architecture is
where β and β D are the fraction of undetected common cause failures and the fraction of detected common cause failures respectively. After any one channel fails, the 1oo2 architecture degrades to 1oo1 architecture to continue working. The 1oo2 architecture would fail completely if any dangerous failure in this remaining channel occurs, so the MUnT of the remaining channel is the voted group equivalent mean down time t GE . The probability of dangerous failure of this remaining channel in this architecture is
Based on the calculations of 1oo1 architecture,
According to its sub-RBD as shown in Fig. 2e-2 ,
Under the condition that any one of the two channels has failed, the reliability of the component with failure rate λ DU in the remaining channel is
Hence, based on Eqs. (9) and (10), consider common cause failure, for 1oo1 architecture,
1oo2D architecture
After the system is started and until any one channel is failed to execute functional safety, both two channels are working, and both two channels have the same failure rates (λ D þλ SD ) and the same MUnTs (t 0 CE ), namely, both two channels have the same probability of failures that result in a degradation of the system to 1oo1D. By considering common cause failures, the probability of failures of any one channel in this architecture is
where λ SD ¼ λ S DC (Diagnostic Coverage, refer to [20] ). After any one channel fails, the 1oo2D architecture degrades to 1oo1D architecture to continue working. The 1oo2D architecture would fail completely if any dangerous undetected failure in this remaining channel occurs, so the MUnT of the remaining channel is the voted group equivalent mean down time t 0 GE . The probability of dangerous failure of the remaining channel is
Based on Eq. (1) and calculation of t CE for 1oo1 architecture, here
Based on calculation of t GE for 1oo2 architecture, here
Hence, based on Eqs. (13) and (14), consider common cause failure, for 1oo2D architecture,
Note that, Eq. (17) is exactly the formula of PFD G for 1oo2D architecture presented in the First Edition of IEC 61508 published in 2000. In the Second Edition published in 2010, the formula has a slight modification as follows,
where the parameter K represents the efficiency of this interchannel comparison/switch mechanism which needs to be determined by an FMEA.
2oo3 architecture
With the same analysis mode for 1oo2 architecture, in this architecture,
Based on the calculation of t CE for 1oo1 architecture, here
According to its sub-RBD as shown in Fig. 2g-2 , as well,
Under the condition that any one of the three channels has failed, the reliability of the component with failure rate λ DU in any one of the remaining two channels is
Hence, based on Eqs. (19) and (20), consider common cause failure, for 2oo3 architecture,
2oo3D architecture
With the same analysis mode for 1oo2D architecture, in this architecture,
Based on calculations of t 0 CE and t 0 GE for 1oo2D architecture, here
Hence, based on Eqs. (22) and (23), consider common cause failure, for 2oo3D architecture,
1oo3 architecture
As analyzed in Section 4.9, this architecture's HFT is 2 and it has three operation stages.
After any two channels fail, the 1oo3 architecture degrades to 1oo1 architecture to continue working. The 1oo3 architecture would fail completely if any dangerous failure in this remaining channel occurs, so the MUnT of the remaining channel is the voted group equivalent mean down time t G2E . The probability of dangerous failure of this last channel in this architecture is
Based on calculation of t CE for 1oo1 architecture, here
Based on calculation of t GE for 2oo3 architecture, here
According to its sub-RBD as shown in Fig. 2i-3 ,
Under the condition that any two of the three channels have failed, the reliability of the component with failure rate λ DU in the remaining channel is
Hence, based on Eqs. (25)- (27), consider common cause failure, for 1oo3 architecture,
6. Results and discussion
Results
From the perspective of system degradation, based on the degradation processes, in Section 4, this paper presents the RBDs of each operation stage of safety architectures and gives a combined RBD for safety architectures in Fig. 2 . In addition, based on those combined RBDs in Section 4, the PFD G for safety architectures is calculated in accordance with degradation processes in Section 5.
This "system degradation" based approach provides a new thought and method for SIL verification, which is applied to several classical redundant architectures of SRS and makes the SIL verification process simpler. Further, the combined RBDs in Section 4 for safety architectures are the same as the RBDs given in IEC 61508-6 and the formulae of PFD G for SIL verifications obtained in Section 5 are identical with those given in IEC 61508, which is a validation of this approach. Moreover, this approach also calculates the t CE (t 0 CE )/t GE (t 0 GE ) according to the system degradation processes and gives more accurate t CE (t 0 CE )/t GE (t 0 GE ) against Refs. [4, 16] , which shows an improvement against Refs. [4, 16] .
Ref. [4] studied PFD G calculations and got the same formulae of PFD G with IEC 61508-6 by the mathematical relationship between probability of dangerous failure and steady failure frequency. However, t GE (t 0 GE ) obtained in that paper are partially different from those in IEC 61508-6, and it did not discuss the equivalent mean down time of dangerous undetected failures. Ref. [16] also studied PFD G calculations and got the same formulae of PFD G with IEC 61508-6 by applying Markov model and using the mathematical relationship between system unavailability and system failure frequency. It also did some research on the equivalent mean down time of dangerous undetected failures, but t CE , t GE and t 0 GE for 1oo2, 1oo2D and 2oo3 architectures are different from IEC 61508-6.
Since the fact that this paper gives the same literal expressions for PFD G calculations with IEC 61508-6, Refs. [4, 16] [4, 16] , as shown in Table 1 . It can be seen that except the 3 new architectures proposed in IEC 61131-6, the results obtained in this paper are almost identical with those given in IEC 61508-6 except t 0 GE of 1oo2D, which shows an improvement against Refs. [4, 16] . The numerical results of t CE (t 0 CE )/t GE (t 0 GE ) and PFD G in Table 2 illustrate the actual difference, the same part is omitted. There is a reason to believe the correctness and accuracy of this "system degradation" based approach.
Discussion
Just as the standard says, the RBD techniques for calculating the average probability of dangerous failure on demand provided in IEC 61508 is informative in nature and should not be interpreted as the only evaluation techniques that might be used. In addition, ISA-TR84.00.02, the Technical Report published by The Table 2 Numerical results comparison of equivalent MDTs and PFD G .
Arch.
Index Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society, proposes other techniques for safety integrity level evaluation, especially Markov Analysis. However, in IEC 61508-6, it does provide a relatively simple approach for assessing the safety integrity level of safetyrelated systems. If one wants more meticulous analysis, Markov Analysis definitely is a good choice since it can cover most aspects for quantitative safety evaluation except uncertainty analysis and sensitivity analysis. Markov Analysis techniques have the capability to fully account for the inherent complexities of safety-related systems, and may be this is why the ISA 84.02 subcommittee has chosen Markov Analysis as the preferred technique for safety and availability evaluation.
In the solutions given in IEC 61508-6, the effects of common cause failures on average probability of dangerous failure on demand are represented by βλ DU ðT 1 =2 þMRTÞþβ D λ DD MTTR for multi-channel architectures. IEC 61508 proposes a number of measures to deal with common cause failures. However, no matter how well these measures are applied, there is a residual probability of common cause failures. Although this does not significantly affect the reliability calculations for single-channel systems, in fact, the potential dangers for common cause failures in a multichannel system are much more fatal. Consequently, how to minimize the effects of common cause failures deserves more research in practical design of hardware in safety-related systems. It is delighted that the difference between Eqs. (17) and (18) is a progress in evaluation of common cause failures for 1oo2D architecture.
System architectures discussed in this paper are provided by way of examples in IEC 61508-6 and IEC 61131-6 and should not be considered exhaustive as there are many other architectures that may be used.
Conclusions
IEC 61508 requires safety integrity level verification for safetyrelated systems. Since any failed channel in a multi-channel system will cause degradation of the system, from the perspective of system degradation, this paper discusses the RBDs of several classical safety architectures based on the degradation processes, and explores the formulae of PFD G and MUnTs also based on the degradation processes. This paper presents a new thought and method for SIL verification, and the results turn out that the "system degradation" based approach is a more accurate approach for SIL verification with high credibility, at the same time, this paper proposes believable solutions for the three new architectures included in IEC 61131-6 since the correctness and accuracy of this "system degradation" based approach.
As discussed in Section 6, the RBD techniques are relatively intuitional and straightforward, but with less consideration relatively. Efforts are still needed to study the more precise solutions and to study the minimization of effects of common cause failures in reality.
